I was recently sent a copy of a new book purporting to be a short work on aphrodisiacs by the famed philosopher-scientist Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274). Many thanks to the publisher for bringing this to my attention. The editor and translator Daniel Newman is an Arabist known for his translations and professor at Durham University. The book, while aimed at a somewhat semi-popular audience - signalled by its publication by al-Saqi, contains an short and useful introduction on Arabic erotic literature, on the purported author, as well as an edition of the Arabic based on three manuscripts and an annotated translation of the English. The contemporary interest in sexualities in the Middle East is clearly the impetus for this work as the preface makes clear. The translated text is relatively short - only 40 odd pages out of the book of about 210 pages. The same text was in fact edited and translated into German for a PhD at Erlangen in 1974 - the editor there also attributed the text to Ṭūsī without any discussion (as I have been told since I have not consulted it myself). The orientalising framing is a problem - why Arab aphrodisiacs in the Middle Ages?
The edition is based on three manuscripts: Berlin Staatsbibliothek 6383 dated 1208/1793 used as a base in the German edition and as the base here as well, Glasgow University Hunter 144.4 in a medical majmūʿa undated and as the editor suggests probably based on the Berlin one (which seems to have been the assessment of the German editor as well), and Cairo Dār al-kutub Ṭibb 582 dated 1224/1809 which is incomplete. The editor says there is also an Istanbul Şehit Ali Paşa 2068 which he did not consult.
But a number of issues suggest that the attribution to Ṭūsī is questionable - and it is clear that the editor does not know much about him, even if his brief excursus on his life is broadly defensible (I am not familiar with him being described as al-muʿallim al-thālith though it is possible someone might have).
1) All three manuscripts are late - around 1800 - and at least two of them have a number of phrases, as the editor admits, in Egyptian Arabic. The Cairo manuscript has a heading attributing it to Ṭūsī.
2) The proemium states that the author is writing/transmitting a book or set of concoctions put together by Abū-l-Barakāt Khwāja Nāṣir al-dīn Ṭūsī for the 'sulṭān Qāzān' or 'sulṭān Ghāzān'. The editor reads this as 'caliph of Qāzān' whom he identifies as Ābāqā Khān (1234-1282). However, it certainly reads as if it says Ghāzān Khān (1271-1304) who was Ābāqā's grandson and as a child of three at Ṭūsī's death could not have been the sulṭān to request such a book. I am also not familiar with this form of Ṭūsī's name and laqab being given in texts.
3) The editor ponders why Ṭūsī would be asked to write a book for an ailing child of the Khān which is actually on aphrodisiacs. It is possible that such a book on medicine was commissioned - but how did it end up being only about aphrodisiacs? Surely there is a problem here.
4) The author of the text does not seem to be Shiʿi - neither the formulation of salutations on the Prophet nor on ʿAlī later in the text match the Shiʿi form. This may just be due to the copyist. But Sunni copyists do not tend to change the form.
The text is designed as a self-help work - the introduction makes clear that these are tried and tested - arranged in 18 chapters.
Now writing on medicine and sexology was fairly common and even part of the circle of Ṭūsī. It is quite possible that this book may be based on some element of oral teaching. If it were a significant work, then surely there would be an earlier manuscript tradition. It seems more likely to me that the text fits a late 18th century interest in such matters, and due to the fame of Ṭūsī as philosopher and scientist was attributed to him to lend an air of authority. And as such tells us more about the social and intellectual (and even sexual interests) of people in Egypt around 1800, and concomitantly how they received and understood the status of Ṭūsī.
Texts, Translations, Thoughts, Philosophy, Literature, Shi'i Islam, Urdu, Persian, Iran, India
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
Saturday, February 15, 2014
Disseminating Ibn ʿArabī: the Role of Qūnawī
For a generation, research on Ṣadr al-dīn Qūnawī (or Qunyawī or perhaps even Konyalı is equally correct, d. 1274), the foremost disciple and step-son of Ibn ʿArabī [d. 1240] has been rather barren. Michel Valsan, a doyen of the traditionalist school, was probably the first European author to write on him, translating his Risālat al-tawajjuh al-atamm back in 1968: "L'Epitre sur Orientation Parfaite (R. al-Tawajjuh al-atamm) by Sadr al-dīn al-Qunâwi" in Études Traditionelles, Vol. 67, pp. 241-268.
Back in the 1970s, there was a dissertation by Stéphane Ruspoli on him and on his Mifṭāh al-ghayb (that he renders as the key to the world beyond the senses) - the latter also translated and published in the 1980s in Paris, as well as an article by William Chittick on his will and last testament published in Sophia Perennis. Ruspoli later published some translations of the works of Ibn ʿArabī such as al-Mashāhid (Paris, 1999) with Qunawī's commentary, as if to demonstrate that a clear understanding of Ibn ʿArabī requires engagement with his primary student. Qunawī's al-Fukūk, a short summary and commentary on his master's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam was also the subject of inquiry of a number of studies and translations back in the 1980s, the best being the edition and Persian translation by the Ẕahabī scholar Muḥammad Khājavī (d. 2013) in 1992.
The next stage of interest was the correct identification of the pivotal correspondence of Qunawī with his contemporary and Avicennan philosopher-scientist and Shiʿi theologian Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī [d. 1274] as the key to understanding the early relationship between the school of Ibn ʿArabī and Avicennan philosophy and the first stage of exchange and influence, which resulted in an edition of the surviving texts by Gudrun Schubert (by Franz Steiner in 1995), and studies by William Chittick and later Caner Dagli (as part of his Princeton PhD in 2006 on the history of waḥdat al-wujūd now forthcoming as a book entitled From Mysticism to Philosophy and Back). A useful attempt at Qunawī's biography is here.
More recently there was a conference in Konya in 2008, and the appearance of two monographs (apart from some articles going back a decade such as Elmore): Richard Todd's Oxford DPhil is being published soon, and Anthony Shaker's McGill PhD was published in 2012 and is reappearing with Brill soon. Here I want to say a few things about the Shaker work entitled Thinking in the Language of Reality. Shaker has already translated two volumes of the Iḥyāʾ of al-Ghazālī for the series published by Islamic Texts Society - in fact as a graduate student, I was the copy-editor for some of these - and is an expert on Sufism with a keen eye for philosophy. His work - I think rather revised from the original dissertation back in the 1990s - attempts at a philosophical interpretation of Qunawī and of medieval Islamic mysticism in an idiom heavily influenced by the German idealism and more recently the phenomenologists such as Heidegger. The work is divided into 14 chapters arranged in three parts: the Language of Logic, the Transformation of Logic, and the Grammar of Transformation with the last part focusing its analysis upon Qunawī's famous commentary on the sūrat al-Fātiḥa known as Iʿjāz al-bayān.
[Incidentally an article on his hermeneutics focusing upon this text and al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya by Richard Todd is forthcoming in a volume on Esoteric Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis edited by Annabel Keeler and myself to be published by Oxford University Press]
Shaker consider Qunavī (as he spells his name) to be a pivotal and philosophically innovative figure, whose significance has been missed by specialists including Chittick and Sachiko Murata about whom he is rather critical. For Shaker, Qunawī represents a shift towards a post-Aristotelian, Islamic thought that brings out the independence of philosophy and he compares these developments in the 13th century to the new opening of philosophy in Europe in the early modern period. He draws upon Hedeiggerian notions of logic and rigour to present the contribution of Qunawī located within his context. Shaker seems to follow a somewhat 'ishrāqī' reading of Avicenna's theological science (ʿilm ilāhī) and suggests that Qunawī's works not least Iʿjāz al-bayān constitutes a shift from the former to an exegetical grammar - and therein lies his significance for the subsequent generations. He makes much of the reading of al-Taʿlīqāt of Avicenna in the Badawī edition some 30 years ago - one wonders where the new edition of the three recensions by Sayyid Hossein Musavian might lead him. From this text, he takes as indication of Avicenna's late shift to a rather apophatic approach to being, or at least recognising that grasping the 'realities of things as they truly are insofar as is humanly possible' is a tall ask indeed. It is the skepticism that one adduces from this Avicennan position that leads on towards the reality of mystical experience. However, a critic might venture that this is an excessively ishrāqī reading of Avicenna and that the thinker's position can easily be understood with recourse to his wider epistemology and psychology: if anything he tended to be an epistemological optimist, and I somehow doubt he would accept the account of Qunawī that reads the process of the intellect as a journeying towards being and an experiential learning - that is very much within the context of a mystical quest that one finds in a number of other thinkers not least in the Safavid period, but while elements of the definition and praxis of philosophy overlap, Avicenna was not really a 'philosophy as acquisition of wisdom and sagacity through spiritual practices and mystical wayfaring' kind of guy even if he knew the language.
In terms of method, while there is an attempt at some intellectual history and contextualisation, Shaker is ultimately interested in what Qunawī can tell us about the nature of reality and how one makes sense of and reads it; this is mysticism as science. And it is an argument for Qunawī as the founder of the systematic approach - not Kāshānī as some suggest or Abū-l-Barakāt or Suhrawardī or even thinkers much later for their settled terminology, rigorous critique of Aristotelianism and clear notion of scientific inquiry. Shaker argues that it is the role of mysticism to open up the construction of language and the formation of meaning that attempts to grasp reality through the experience of the seeker - the meaning of the text that occurs through the interaction on the horizon of the self's experience of the world, that takes one beyond the restrictions of much formal logic and argumentation to this point confined by the psychology of binarism and structure in Aristotelian thought that represents an ontological commitment to alterity, metaphysical multiplicity, hylomorphism, and the basic insistence upon substances as unchanging and stable substrata that constitute the basic building blocks of reality. However, one wonder why the emphasis on Qunawī? If anything the 13th century is the pivotal period in which a number of attempts are made to dethrone Aristotelianism just as it becomes - in the modified form of Avicennism - intellectually dominant in theology, philosophy, and even in Sufism. Or is it that we have neglected the role of Qunawī and because he seems removed from the concession to Avicennism that we find in Kāshānī and subsequent commentators we find his style obstruse? In that sense is the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā and other Safavid critics of Avicenna - unsuccessful in the first instance one might add since it takes at least 150 years or so for Sadrian approaches to become dominant in the Islamic East - a proper recovery of Qunawī? And it is perhaps no accident that he is cited much by the Shirazi thinker.
Mysticism is Qunawī's way to make sense of the problem of the hiddenness of God that is immanent in most monotheistic traditions. Hence the articulation of one of the key features of the ontology of the unfolding of the cosmos as manifestation of the divine through the doctrine of the five divine presences that finds its first articulation here: 1) God as absconditus in the supra-sensible, supra-intelligible world is that being which is beyond our ken, 2) the most material and removed presence that is fully witnessed (ʿālam al-shahāda) are those tokens that manifest the divine names, 3) the spiritual realm (ʿālam al-arwāḥ) that lies below that of the hidden God, 4) the level of the imagination that links the sensible to the spiritual and demonstrates the ability of the human to transcend materiality, and finally 5) the mediate imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl al-muṭlaq), the cloud of unknowing that is the true bridge between human experience and those levels of the divine deployed for human understanding.
In terms of the sources, his main focus is upon Iʿjāz al-bayān through the famous Hyderabad edition (reprinted many times), the correspondence with Ṭūsī using the Schubert edition supplemented by MS Șehit Ali Paşa 1366, al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya not based on the Yahia edition but on MS Bibliothèque Nationale 1354 and MS Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek Vienna 1913, al-Nuṣūṣ based on the Tehran lithograph, al-Fukūk in Khājavī's edition of 1992 and Sharḥ al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā based on MS Șehit Ali Paşa 425, Aşir Efendi 431/2 and Şehit Ali Paşa 1366.
In the end, Shaker returns to the possibility of God-talk and how the insights of Qunawī might help here, not least in the postulation of two positions that become central to the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā - and I wonder whether this represents the influence of Ṭūsī and perhaps Suhrawardī upon him? - namely, the modulated singular reality of being (tashkīk al-wujūd) and what the study of late neoplatonism calls the identity thesis, the breakdown of alterity in the identity of the knower and the known, through knowledge that is immediate, infallible, presential. Perhaps I am reading things in terms of those thinkers I know best but it seems that Shaker is basically making at least partially a claim for why the metaphysics and critique of Avicenna inherent in the work of Mullā Ṣadrā provide the sort of epistemological openings that we need in order to understand 'things as they truly are' and to know the world that we inhabit. The exegetical grammar perhaps takes us in some different directions and one wonders whether there is an interesting intersection there with the occult area of lettrism that at Qunawī's time and certainly in following generations become a dominant alternative philosophy. Certainly I think this aspect of Qunawī's thought strikes one as challenging and significant and Shaker is clear that it is the culmination of his metaphysics. This whole argument is located within what is admittedly a rather different work that may appeal to those who work in Sufism and probably continental philosophy. One suspects that those with stronger tastes for the analytical might be appalled by aspects of this. There is much more to be said - and maybe I have the wrong end of the stick - but these are some preliminary thoughts.
Back in the 1970s, there was a dissertation by Stéphane Ruspoli on him and on his Mifṭāh al-ghayb (that he renders as the key to the world beyond the senses) - the latter also translated and published in the 1980s in Paris, as well as an article by William Chittick on his will and last testament published in Sophia Perennis. Ruspoli later published some translations of the works of Ibn ʿArabī such as al-Mashāhid (Paris, 1999) with Qunawī's commentary, as if to demonstrate that a clear understanding of Ibn ʿArabī requires engagement with his primary student. Qunawī's al-Fukūk, a short summary and commentary on his master's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam was also the subject of inquiry of a number of studies and translations back in the 1980s, the best being the edition and Persian translation by the Ẕahabī scholar Muḥammad Khājavī (d. 2013) in 1992.
The next stage of interest was the correct identification of the pivotal correspondence of Qunawī with his contemporary and Avicennan philosopher-scientist and Shiʿi theologian Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī [d. 1274] as the key to understanding the early relationship between the school of Ibn ʿArabī and Avicennan philosophy and the first stage of exchange and influence, which resulted in an edition of the surviving texts by Gudrun Schubert (by Franz Steiner in 1995), and studies by William Chittick and later Caner Dagli (as part of his Princeton PhD in 2006 on the history of waḥdat al-wujūd now forthcoming as a book entitled From Mysticism to Philosophy and Back). A useful attempt at Qunawī's biography is here.
More recently there was a conference in Konya in 2008, and the appearance of two monographs (apart from some articles going back a decade such as Elmore): Richard Todd's Oxford DPhil is being published soon, and Anthony Shaker's McGill PhD was published in 2012 and is reappearing with Brill soon. Here I want to say a few things about the Shaker work entitled Thinking in the Language of Reality. Shaker has already translated two volumes of the Iḥyāʾ of al-Ghazālī for the series published by Islamic Texts Society - in fact as a graduate student, I was the copy-editor for some of these - and is an expert on Sufism with a keen eye for philosophy. His work - I think rather revised from the original dissertation back in the 1990s - attempts at a philosophical interpretation of Qunawī and of medieval Islamic mysticism in an idiom heavily influenced by the German idealism and more recently the phenomenologists such as Heidegger. The work is divided into 14 chapters arranged in three parts: the Language of Logic, the Transformation of Logic, and the Grammar of Transformation with the last part focusing its analysis upon Qunawī's famous commentary on the sūrat al-Fātiḥa known as Iʿjāz al-bayān.
[Incidentally an article on his hermeneutics focusing upon this text and al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya by Richard Todd is forthcoming in a volume on Esoteric Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis edited by Annabel Keeler and myself to be published by Oxford University Press]
Shaker consider Qunavī (as he spells his name) to be a pivotal and philosophically innovative figure, whose significance has been missed by specialists including Chittick and Sachiko Murata about whom he is rather critical. For Shaker, Qunawī represents a shift towards a post-Aristotelian, Islamic thought that brings out the independence of philosophy and he compares these developments in the 13th century to the new opening of philosophy in Europe in the early modern period. He draws upon Hedeiggerian notions of logic and rigour to present the contribution of Qunawī located within his context. Shaker seems to follow a somewhat 'ishrāqī' reading of Avicenna's theological science (ʿilm ilāhī) and suggests that Qunawī's works not least Iʿjāz al-bayān constitutes a shift from the former to an exegetical grammar - and therein lies his significance for the subsequent generations. He makes much of the reading of al-Taʿlīqāt of Avicenna in the Badawī edition some 30 years ago - one wonders where the new edition of the three recensions by Sayyid Hossein Musavian might lead him. From this text, he takes as indication of Avicenna's late shift to a rather apophatic approach to being, or at least recognising that grasping the 'realities of things as they truly are insofar as is humanly possible' is a tall ask indeed. It is the skepticism that one adduces from this Avicennan position that leads on towards the reality of mystical experience. However, a critic might venture that this is an excessively ishrāqī reading of Avicenna and that the thinker's position can easily be understood with recourse to his wider epistemology and psychology: if anything he tended to be an epistemological optimist, and I somehow doubt he would accept the account of Qunawī that reads the process of the intellect as a journeying towards being and an experiential learning - that is very much within the context of a mystical quest that one finds in a number of other thinkers not least in the Safavid period, but while elements of the definition and praxis of philosophy overlap, Avicenna was not really a 'philosophy as acquisition of wisdom and sagacity through spiritual practices and mystical wayfaring' kind of guy even if he knew the language.
In terms of method, while there is an attempt at some intellectual history and contextualisation, Shaker is ultimately interested in what Qunawī can tell us about the nature of reality and how one makes sense of and reads it; this is mysticism as science. And it is an argument for Qunawī as the founder of the systematic approach - not Kāshānī as some suggest or Abū-l-Barakāt or Suhrawardī or even thinkers much later for their settled terminology, rigorous critique of Aristotelianism and clear notion of scientific inquiry. Shaker argues that it is the role of mysticism to open up the construction of language and the formation of meaning that attempts to grasp reality through the experience of the seeker - the meaning of the text that occurs through the interaction on the horizon of the self's experience of the world, that takes one beyond the restrictions of much formal logic and argumentation to this point confined by the psychology of binarism and structure in Aristotelian thought that represents an ontological commitment to alterity, metaphysical multiplicity, hylomorphism, and the basic insistence upon substances as unchanging and stable substrata that constitute the basic building blocks of reality. However, one wonder why the emphasis on Qunawī? If anything the 13th century is the pivotal period in which a number of attempts are made to dethrone Aristotelianism just as it becomes - in the modified form of Avicennism - intellectually dominant in theology, philosophy, and even in Sufism. Or is it that we have neglected the role of Qunawī and because he seems removed from the concession to Avicennism that we find in Kāshānī and subsequent commentators we find his style obstruse? In that sense is the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā and other Safavid critics of Avicenna - unsuccessful in the first instance one might add since it takes at least 150 years or so for Sadrian approaches to become dominant in the Islamic East - a proper recovery of Qunawī? And it is perhaps no accident that he is cited much by the Shirazi thinker.
Mysticism is Qunawī's way to make sense of the problem of the hiddenness of God that is immanent in most monotheistic traditions. Hence the articulation of one of the key features of the ontology of the unfolding of the cosmos as manifestation of the divine through the doctrine of the five divine presences that finds its first articulation here: 1) God as absconditus in the supra-sensible, supra-intelligible world is that being which is beyond our ken, 2) the most material and removed presence that is fully witnessed (ʿālam al-shahāda) are those tokens that manifest the divine names, 3) the spiritual realm (ʿālam al-arwāḥ) that lies below that of the hidden God, 4) the level of the imagination that links the sensible to the spiritual and demonstrates the ability of the human to transcend materiality, and finally 5) the mediate imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl al-muṭlaq), the cloud of unknowing that is the true bridge between human experience and those levels of the divine deployed for human understanding.
In terms of the sources, his main focus is upon Iʿjāz al-bayān through the famous Hyderabad edition (reprinted many times), the correspondence with Ṭūsī using the Schubert edition supplemented by MS Șehit Ali Paşa 1366, al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya not based on the Yahia edition but on MS Bibliothèque Nationale 1354 and MS Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek Vienna 1913, al-Nuṣūṣ based on the Tehran lithograph, al-Fukūk in Khājavī's edition of 1992 and Sharḥ al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā based on MS Șehit Ali Paşa 425, Aşir Efendi 431/2 and Şehit Ali Paşa 1366.
In the end, Shaker returns to the possibility of God-talk and how the insights of Qunawī might help here, not least in the postulation of two positions that become central to the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā - and I wonder whether this represents the influence of Ṭūsī and perhaps Suhrawardī upon him? - namely, the modulated singular reality of being (tashkīk al-wujūd) and what the study of late neoplatonism calls the identity thesis, the breakdown of alterity in the identity of the knower and the known, through knowledge that is immediate, infallible, presential. Perhaps I am reading things in terms of those thinkers I know best but it seems that Shaker is basically making at least partially a claim for why the metaphysics and critique of Avicenna inherent in the work of Mullā Ṣadrā provide the sort of epistemological openings that we need in order to understand 'things as they truly are' and to know the world that we inhabit. The exegetical grammar perhaps takes us in some different directions and one wonders whether there is an interesting intersection there with the occult area of lettrism that at Qunawī's time and certainly in following generations become a dominant alternative philosophy. Certainly I think this aspect of Qunawī's thought strikes one as challenging and significant and Shaker is clear that it is the culmination of his metaphysics. This whole argument is located within what is admittedly a rather different work that may appeal to those who work in Sufism and probably continental philosophy. One suspects that those with stronger tastes for the analytical might be appalled by aspects of this. There is much more to be said - and maybe I have the wrong end of the stick - but these are some preliminary thoughts.
Wednesday, February 12, 2014
Sonja Brentjes on Epistles 1 and 2 of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ edition and translation
Guest post from
Sonja Brentjes
A few weeks ago I
posted a couple of reviews of recent volumes published from the Brethren of
Purity’s epistles series. In part of it, I made a number of blunders which
Sonja Brentjes pointed out and suggested I should correct. It's a pleasure to have her as a guest on my blog. To do that, here is
her review of the volume on epistles 1 and 2.
Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. On
Arithmetic and Geometry. An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of
EPISTLES 1 & 2, Edited
and Translated by Nader El-Bizri, with a Foreword. Oxford: Oxford University
Press in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2012.
This book is part of
the larger project to produce a critical edition of the 52 epistles composed
presumably in the 10th century (one dating proposal considers also
the first half of the 11th century) by a group of men, called the
Brethren of Purity, who lived probably in Basra, may have been of Persian
origin and may have adhered to Shiʿi or more specifically Ismaili beliefs
(such an adherence is claimed by both the Imami Shiʿa and the Ismailis as
the second institutional publisher of the series indicates, but doubted by some
academics). The book’s editor and translator, Nader el-Bizri, is also the
current chief editor of the entire project.
The present book
contains the first two of the 52 epistles treating number theory according to
Nikomachos of Gerasa (2nd c) and elementary Euclidean geometry
combined with geometrical knowledge of the craftsmen in Arabic and an English
translation. Before the translation is the Foreword, mentioned on the book
cover, an introduction and a so-called technical introduction. After the
English translation follows an appendix to the second epistle, a selected
biography, a subject index and a geographical index of places. Before the
Arabic edition come an Arabic appendix and two indices (subject matter, names).
There are three
previous translations of the first epistle (two in German (Dieterici 1868,
reprint 1969, Brentjes 1984) and one in English (Goldstein 1964)) and one
German translation of the second (Dieterici 1865 (vol. III), reprint 1969) as
well as several editions of the entire corpus (Bombay 1887-89, Cairo 1374/1928, Beirut 1957, Beirut-Paris 1995) and partial editions. None
of the editions is considered to be a critical one. Hence the effort of the Institute of Ismaili Studies to prepare such a critical edition. Here begin, however,
the problems. Not only is there today widespread doubt in general that
something like an urtext can indeed be reconstructed for any text and author,
there is also serious doubt that such a project is possible at all in particular
for the epistles of the Brethren as Paul E. Walker explained in his talk at
this year’s meeting of the American Oriental Society in Portland, March 15-18
(What was the original form of the Rasā᾿il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā᾿?). In his abstracts, he states the
following:” A recent project undertaken by the Institute of Ismaili Studies and a
team of scholars aims to produce a critical edition of this text. However work
so far has revealed major problems with establishing the exact nature of the
original work. The oldest and best manuscripts do not agree. Information in the
existing Bombay-Cairo- Beirut edition suggests strongly that that version is
itself Fatimid (or based on a Fatimid era copy). It thus may predate all of the
known mss. Wide discrepancies among these textual sources indicate surely that
there never was a single version of the Epistles, but instead a jumble of
alternates with various additions and alterations perhaps contributed by early
editors and copyists, even by the Ikhwān themselves.“ (http://www.umich.edu/~aos/2013/Abstracts2013.pdf, p. 51)
El-Bizri was aware of the difficulties presented by
the different textual versions, but chose the oldest complete manuscript (MS
Istanbul, Süleymaniye, Atif Efendi 1681 (dated 578h, i.e. 1182) as his basis
for the edition and translation, which he altered at times by adding marginalia
or passages from six other manuscripts and one printed edition (Beirut 1957).
The problem with his approach is that he admits clearly that none of the other
six manuscripts nor the text of the Beirut edition have the text of Atif Efendi
1681 as their archetype. He concludes that no stemma can be established (pp.
58f). In relationship to the two epistles published in this book, this
evaluation applies, according to el-Bizri, in particular to the second one on
geometry. Moreover, el-Bizri states clearly that Atif Efendi 1681 itself does
not always offer the most reliable text (p. 51). These comments support Walker’s
stance that a critical edition of the epistles is impossible. In regard to the
two epistles presented in this book, el-Bizri emphasizes that the difficulties
and differences concern in particular the part on geometry (p. 59). Hence, any
reader of the work should be aware that what s/he will be reading is just one
among several possible variants of the second epistle.
Beyond this matter
of principle, the Arabic texts and their English translations suffer under
severe shortcomings that reflect el-Bizri’s lack of experience in history of
mathematics in Antiquity and Islamicate societies, as a translator of a
technical text and as an editor. Moreover, he misunderstood or misinterpreted
more than once Arabic passages and mathematical statements. Since these
shortcomings permeate the entire book, the space provided for the review does
not suffice for presenting a list of all these different kinds of mistakes.
They are particularly frequent in the chapter on number theory, where almost
every other page contains several of them. Some of the problems become already
visible in the introductions. There, el-Bizri relies primarily on a few works
of the historian of mathematics in Islamicate societies Roshdi Rashed, whose
historiographical positions and modernizing transformations of medieval
mathematics are not shared by many colleagues in the field. Due to his
unfamiliarity with the subject matter and the historiographical issues at
stake, el-Bizri’s summary even trivializes Rashed’s judgments.
The Arabic text and
its English translation are marred by numerous kinds of mistakes and wrong
decisions, the English translation more so than the Arabic edition. They show
el-Bizri’s severe lack of expertise as editor, translator and historian of
mathematics. The available space for reviewing does not allow me to give a
survey of these mistakes with examples. Thus I decided to describe them in a
general manner without specific examples.
1.
Mistakes
in the Arabic texts
The mistakes in the
Arabic texts result primarily from the editorial position taken by el-Bizri and
the unclear procedures he followed. They encompass questionable decisions
concerning the inclusion of marginalia and alternative readings, decisions to
preserve clearly wrong sequences of textual passages, omissions of most likely
original passages and the occasional modernizing changes of the medieval text. In
addition, there are several typing and vocalization errors.
2.
Mistakes
in the English translation
The mistakes in the
English translation in contrast are manifold. They concern wrong decisions in
regard to mathematical terminology, the lack of understanding of medieval technical
language as well as historical changes in grammar or semantic, the omission of parts
of the Arabic text, which indicate shortcomings in proofreading, and the
replacement of medieval numerical notations by modern forms. The desire to
produce a flowing english text has misled the translator to disregard issues of
content.
a.
Mathematical
terminology, misunderstood medieval technical language and historical changes
of language
The content of the
two epistles is elementary and well known through English translations of its
Greek fundaments in Euclid’s Elements and Nicomachus’ Introduction to
Arithmetic. As in the case with decisions on editorial issues, el-Bizri
chose different approaches when translating. In a number of cases he
translated, correctly so, literally, while in other cases, where such a literal
rendering would have suited the text and its sources equally well, he replaced
the terms by unusual expressions that have no background in the sources nor in modern
mathematical language.
The opposite variant
of inappropriate decision when translating can also be found, namely when translating
one of two related Arabic technical terms not literally, but according to its
mathematical meaning and contemporary naming, but the second, in contrast, in a
literal manner, which does not make sense mathematically.
The third case, more
often appearing than the two previous ones, is the wrong translation, either
literal or interpretively, of a mathematical term.
b.
Omissions
and additions
Several omissions of
passages extant in the Arabic edition document in the English translation
highlight the lack of care when proofreading. The continued additions to the
translation, clearly marked by square brackets, of elementary mathematical
explanations, elementary textual content already provided by the text itself in
earlier passages and undisputed, well-established Arabic mathematical terms
with their Greek, incorrectly transliterated equivalents are as a rule
superfluous, at times false and should be placed in those cases, where they are
valid, in the footnotes or be discussed in a commentary.
c.
Problems
in regard to content
This lack of
expertise comes also to the fore in el-Bizri’s problems with comprehending the
language of the two epistles and its transformation into a modernized English
text. A continuously occurring issue is the interpretation of expressions
standing for finite or infinite repetitition of procedures. Phrases like
bāligha mā bāligha do not indicate infinite, but finite repetitions.
Expressions like ilā lā nihāya, however, mark clearly infinity. In some cases
like the summation of series the confusion between these two types of
expressions yields wrong mathematical statements in the English text. In addition to such mistakes that probably
result from applying modern understandings to medieval concepts substantial
mistranslations of longer passages also occur.
3.
Mathematical
mistakes
Some of the
mathematical mistakes are the result of wrong translating decisions, while
others stem from a desire to adapt medieval statement to forms taught in
secondary schools today. This kind of modification illustrates el-Bizri’s
unfamiliarity with standards in history of mathematics and the widely agreed
upon rule that translations should preserve the kind and level of mathematical
knowledge and practice of the original and avoid transforming them into something
that belongs to a different period and different mathematical culture. Finally
there are several elementary technical mistakes in the translation of the
mathematical content.
4.
Historical
mistakes and omissions
These items consist
of incomplete or false historical information provided by the editor.
Numerous of
el-Bizri’s mistakes could have been avoided, if he had checked the English
translation of Nikomachos’ Introduction to Arithmetic and the German and
English translations of the two epistles presented in this book. The problems
with the editorial decisions as well as the inappropriate additions to the
translated text could have been avoided in most cases, if he had consulted
contemporary editions and translations of Arabic or Latin mathematical and
philosophical texts by other colleagues.
Sonja Brentjes
MPIWG, Berlin
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